I received my
Ph.D. in Economics from
CEMFI in July 2019, working under the supervision of Profs.
Nezih Guner and
Josep Pijoan-Mas.
After graduation, I worked on public policy evaluation at
AIReF, and then joint the Department of Economics at
CUNEF Universidad in September 2020, where I'm an Assistant Professor in Economics.
I'm a
quantitative macroeconomist with research interests in the fields of:
- Family economics: integenerational mobility, fertility
- Public economics: inequality, taxes, transfers
- Firm dynamics: productivity, frictions
Flattening of the Phillips curve with state-dependent prices and wages
w/
James Costain and
Anton Nakov.
The Economic Journal, Volume 132, No. 642, February 2022, 546-581.
Abstract
Working Paper
Slides
Codes
Published paper
We study monetary transmission in a model of state-dependent prices and wages based on "control costs". Stickiness arises because precise choice is costly: decision-makers tolerate errors both in the timing of adjustments, and in the new level at which the price or wage is set. The model is calibrated to microdata on the size and frequency of price and wage changes. In our simulations, money shocks have less persistent real effects than in the Calvo framework; nonetheless, the model exhibits a substantial degree of non-neutrality, driven mainly by wage rigidity. State-dependent nominal stickiness implies a flatter Phillips curve as trend inflation declines, because price and wage adjustments become less frequent, making short-run inflation less reactive to shocks. Our model can explain almost half of the observed decline in the slope of the Phillips curve since 2000.
Aggregate effects of firing costs with endogenous firm productivity growth
Macroeconomic Dynamics, Volume 27, Issue 4, June 2023, 945–965..
Abstract
Working Paper
Slides
Codes
Published paper
This paper quantifies the aggregate effects of firing costs in a model of firm dynamics where firm-level productivity is determined by innovation. In the model, the productivity distribution is endogenous, and thus, potentially affected by policy changes, allowing the model to capture both the static (allocative efficiency) and dynamic effects (changes in the distribution of firms' productivity) of firing costs. The model is calibrated to match key features of firms' hiring and firing behavior using firm-level data from Spanish non-financial firms. I show that firing costs equivalent to 2.5 monthly wages produce a 4% loss in aggregate productivity relative to the frictionless economy. The aggregate productivity losses rise to more than 10% when firing costs are equivalent to one year's wage. I show that a model with a standard AR(1) productivity process can only generate between 45 and 50% of these productivity losses. Overall, the results suggest that ignoring the effects of frictions on the dynamics of firms' productivity can substantially underestimate their aggregate effects.
Intergenerational persistence in welfare program participation
w/
Javier López Segovia
Abstract
Working Paper
Slides
Codes
Participation in social insurance (welfare) programs exhibits a significant persistence across generations. Children of welfare program participants are more likely to participate in these programs when they become adults, even after controlling for their income. This suggests some persistence in some underlying factors that affect the participation decisions of eligible households. While some eligible households in need might choose not to participate, other eligible households in better conditions benefit from welfare programs, limiting the effectiveness of these programs. To understand the source of this persistence and its implications on households and their children, we build a quantitative model overlapping generations with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. In the model, poor households may decide not to receive welfare transfers due to a utility cost from program participation. This cost depends on whether parents of a household had participated in welfare programs. Households also invest money and time in children's skills, which determine their labor-market ability as adults. The model is calibrated to the US data on welfare participation, income inequality, and intergenerational mobility from the 2000s. Using our calibrated model, we study how much of the persistence in welfare participation is due to the cost of participation and how this persistence affects parental investment in children. We find that around 20% of the intergenerational correlation in welfare participation can be explained by the transmission of the welfare culture across generations.
Intergenerational effects of child-related tax benefits in the US
New draft coming soon.
Abstract
Working Paper
Slides
Codes
The presence of children in US households reduces tax liabilities through deductions and tax credits. Through the lens of the quantity-quality trade-off, these benefits distort parental choices over the number and human capital of children by altering their relative implicit price. This paper quantifies the effects of child-related tax benefits on fertility and intergenerational mobility using a general equilibrium life-cycle model with endogenous fertility choices and parental investments in children's human capital, calibrated to US data. I show that tax benefits increase fertility by 16%, but they do so at the expense of lowering human capital of children. More importantly, these effects are particularly strong among low educated mothers, which widens the gap in human capital between children of low and high educated mothers. As a result, the intergenerational persistence of education increases by 37% when tax benefits are introduced. I also show that education subsidies are also effective at fostering fertility but, as opposed to tax benefits, they do not decrease children's human capital, nor intergenerational mobility.
Size-dependent regulations in Spain
w/
Miguel Almunia,
Juan F. Jimeno and
David López
Rodriguez.
Abstract
Working Paper
Slides
Codes
We study the effects of two size-dependent regulations applicable in Spain: firms with more than 50 employees are subject to more onerous labor regulations, while firms with annual operating revenue above €6 million are subject to stricter tax monitoring. We find substantial bunching of firms just below the revenue threshold and a modest response to the employment threshold. However, the amount of bunching at the employment threshold is substantial when focusing on firms that are close to crossing the revenue threshold, suggesting an interaction effect of the two regulations. We specify a simple model of firm dynamics that replicates the patterns observed in the data and we use the model to quantify the aggregate effect of these regulations, and to evaluate alternative policies.
